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FOREWORD
This monograph is intended to draw attention to
the challenges faced by the United States in developing a coordinated strategy for dealing with North Korea. Despite the many decades of direct U.S. involvement on the Korean Peninsula, we continue to have
little understanding of the North Korean culture or of
events inside North Korea. We also do not have a longterm coordinated strategy for North Korea. Over the
past decade, the United States has focused much of its
attention on the Middle East and the War on Terror,
and seems to only focus on North Korea in response
to crises when they arise on the peninsula.
Mr. Boik provides a timely analysis and thoughtful insights into the significant challenges faced by the
United States in developing a strategy for North Korea. He examines the complex history of U.S. policy
toward North Korea over the past decade that has
left the United States in a position of having no real
strategy and virtually no influence over North Korea.
He accurately addresses the complicated regional
concerns and national security interests of North Korea’s neighbors and their impact on each country’s approach to North Korea. Most importantly, he looks at
how the North Korean culture and history have influenced the attitudes of North Korean society and their
relationship with the outside world. He concludes by
pointing out that, despite the numerous inherent challenges, the United States must develop a strategy to
engage Pyongyang if we expect to have any influence
over the future direction of events in North Korea.
Mr. Boik is uniquely qualified to write this analysis, having served as the Senior U.S. Government Rep-
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resentative in Pyongyang, North Korea, during two
30-day Joint U.S.-Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (North Korea) Missing-in-Action (MIA) Recovery Operations, which searched for missing American
soldiers from the Korean War. In this position, he was
able to travel throughout North Korea and had daily
contact with senior North Korean military and foreign
ministry officials. Additionally, Mr. Boik has participated as a member of a Department of Defense delegation negotiating access to North Korean sites for
the MIA recovery teams.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on North Korea. This analysis should
be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to address the
complicated factors related to U.S. policy toward the
Korean Peninsula. This work will also benefit those
seeking a greater understanding of the policy issues
related to North Korea.

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph is intended to generate discussion
on the challenges of developing a coordinated U.S.
strategy toward North Korea. It begins by looking at
U.S. policy and actions toward North Korea and the
situation on the Korean Peninsula over the past decade. This monograph examines the regional interests
of China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the United
States in relation to North Korea and the impact that
North Korean culture and traditions have had on
North Korean society.
Based on this analysis, the monograph recommends that, if we expect to have any influence over
events in North Korea, U.S. policy must emphasize engagement with Pyongyang. This engagement should
include discussions, negotiations, cultural exchanges,
and even diplomatic relations. Only by engaging
North Korea on multiple levels, will we begin to understand each other, and only then will we be able to
exercise some level of positive influence on them.
This will not be easy, nor will it happen quickly.
North Korea is a difficult nation to negotiate with and
often reacts in a manner that outside observers see as
counterproductive. Although it will not be easy, a policy of actively engaging North Korea will eventually
provide the United States with a forum to exert a limited degree of influence on the Pyongyang leadership.
It will also give us a better understanding of what is
actually happening inside North Korea. Ultimately,
we must keep in mind that, as in the case of Eastern
Europe, events on the ground are likely to outpace
any planning we do. It is extremely critical that we
have both an awareness of events as they are occur-
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ring and the flexibility of action to ensure appropriate
measured responses.
A policy of engagement toward the North is also
a double-edged sword for the Pyongyang leadership.
North Korea’s biggest weakness may, in fact, be opening up to the West. When this begins to happen, there
is significant potential for the regime to be weakened.
Yet North Korea’s current economic situation leaves
its leadership few options. The leadership seems to understand that they must work with the United States
and other nations in order to get assistance. However,
the more North Korea’s population is able to see and
have contact with Americans and other Westerners,
the more they will start to see what they really do not
have and cannot achieve under the current regime.
The challenge will then become one of controlling the
North Korean population’s expectations and grievances so they do not resort to violence.
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Map 1. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea).
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North Korea

South Korea

Total Area

120,540 sq km

98,480 sq km

Land

120,410 sq km

98,190 sq km

Water

130 sq km

290 sq km

Land Use
Arable Land

22.40%

16.58%

Permanent Crops

1.66%

2.01%

Other

75.94%

81.41% (2005)

23,479,088
(July 2008 est.)

48,379,392
(July 2008 est.)

0-14 Yrs Old

22.9%
(male 2,733,352 female 2,654,186)

17.4%
(male 4,431,315 female 4,004,810)

15-64 Yrs Old

68.2%
(male 7,931,484 female 8,083,626)

72%
(male 17,760,975 female 17,095,436)

Over 65 Yrs Old

8.8%
(make 751,401 female 1,325,040)

10.5%
(male 2,030,931 female 3,055,925)

People
Population
Age Structure

Median Age

32.7

36.7

Population Growth Rate

0.73%

0.27%

Literacy Rate

99.90%

97.90%

GDP

$40 billion

$1,312 trillion

GDP Growth Rate

1.10%

4.30%

Economy

GDP Per Capita

$1,800

$27,100

GDP by Sector

Agriculture 23.3%
Industry 43.1%
Services 33.6%

Agriculture 2.9%
Industry 39.4%
Services 57.7%

Labor Force

20 Million (2004 est)

24.34 Million

Unemployment Rate

na

3.20%

Railways

5,235 std guage

3,381 std guage

Roadways

724 km paved
24,830 km unpaved

83,640 km paved
23,000 km unpaved

Transportation

Military
Manpower

1.1 million (4.7 Reserves) (2005 est)

687,700

Military Expenditure

$5.1 billion (31% GDP)(2005 est)

$14.5 billion(2.7% GDP)

Note: Adapted from the CIA World Factbook 2009, New York:
Skyhorse Publishing Co. Ltd., 2008.

Figure 1. Comparison between North and South
Korea.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Few conflicts are as protracted as the one in Korea, where
deeply hostile and anachronistic Cold War attitudes have
posed major security problems for half a century. To be
more precise, two specters haunt the peninsula: a military escalation, even outright war, and a North Korean
collapse, which could easily destabilize the northeast
Asian region.
		
		
		

Roland Bleiker
Author of “Divided North Korea:
Toward a Culture of Reconciliation”1

For more than 20 years, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea, or DPRK) has been
a problem for various U.S. policymakers. During the
1990s, North Korea faced several crises. In 1991, the
Soviet Union, its key ally, collapsed, ending the main
source of financial support for the regime. Three years
later in 1994, the “Great Leader,” Kim Il Sung, died. In
the mid-to-late 1990s, North Korea faced severe flooding and famine. To many observers, it appeared that
North Korea had little chance of survival, and that the
country would collapse within a few years.
Today, however, as a result of missed opportunities, the United States finds itself faced with a North
Korea that has a limited nuclear capability it is unlikely to be willing to negotiate away. On January 15,
2009, the London Times reported that Kim Jong Il had
finally designated his youngest son, 25-year-old Kim
Jong Un, as his successor.2 Little is known about Kim
Jong Un in the West beyond the fact that he was educated in Switzerland. He has seldom been seen in public. More importantly, it appears that unlike the efforts
1

made by Kim Il Sung to groom Kim Jong Il to assume
power, little has been done to prepare Kim Jong Un or
the North Korean people for this succession, making
it unclear whether the central government in Pyongyang will be able to maintain stability once Kim Jong
Il dies.
Perhaps the most critical challenge for the United
States is that our current strategy for dealing with
North Korea continues to be reactive and focused almost exclusively on the issue of nuclear weapons. U.S.
policymakers appear to have made little or no effort to
develop a broader regional strategy for dealing with
events in North Korea once Kim Jong Il dies. There also
appears to be little effort being made to put the United States in a position to influence events that could
bring about a peaceful unification of the two Koreas.
As Victor Cha, Director of Asian Studies, Georgetown
University, recently wrote, “In what would be the
single most important contingency that could impact
the South Korean economy and security for decades,
there is no agreed upon plan for how to deal with a
collapsing North Korea.”3 He further wrote,
Given the stakes involved, you would think that the
U.S., South Korea and other regional partners had
some type of agreed upon plan. Nope. There is a “concept plan” that has been discussed in the past between
Washington and Seoul, but all dialogue ceased under
the previous administration in Seoul. The Roh Moohyun government rejected planning discussions because it believed that such discussions would offend
Pyongyang and give the impression that the U.S. and
Seoul were actively conspiring to collapse the regime.
The Roh government instead tried to work on its own
plan, without sharing any common concept of operations with the U.S. 4
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Sadly, it appears that the U.S. Government also
failed to capitalize on President Clinton’s recent mission to North Korea. While he successfully obtained
the release of two U.S. journalists being held by North
Korea, it does not appear that any opportunities to
move forward were discussed, despite the fact that he
was the first senior American to meet with Kim Jong
Il since Ambassador Madeleine Albright’s visit almost
a decade ago.
Incredibly little is actually known about the North
Korean leadership and events inside the country. Few
Westerners and almost no Americans have been allowed to visit North Korea in recent years, leading to
an incomplete understanding of the North. That is our
greatest challenge in developing any strategy for the
Korean Peninsula.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Roland Bleiker, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. ix.
2. Leo Lewis, “Kim Jong Il ‘Names Favourite Son Jong Un
as Successor’ in North Korea,” London Times, January 15, 2009,
available from www.prisonplanet.comkim-jong-il-names-favouriteson-jong-un-as-successor-in-north-korea.html.
3. Victor Cha, “We Have No Plan,” Chosun Ilbo, June 9, 2008,
available from english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200806/2008
06090015.html.
4. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2
PUTTING THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN
CONTEXT
The question (preparing for a collapse of the North
Korean regime) has been completely taboo. The major
players are completely unprepared. The South Koreans
don’t want to touch it, and the U.S. takes its lead from
the South.
		
		
		

Andrei Lankov
(North Korea Expert)
Kookmin University (Seoul)1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will address the situation on the Korean Peninsula from the perspective of recent U.S. policy
and actions toward North Korea. It will look at North
Korea from the overall context of the international environment and it will address the first component of
the Interagency Conflict Management Strategy Model2
considerations by defining the problem and providing
an assessment of the current situation in North Korea
and on the peninsula. Finally, the chapter will look at
the nature of the threat posed by North Korea.
BACKGROUND
Throughout most of the last 10 years, critics have
argued that the United States under President Bush
seemed to have little interest or inclination in developing a coherent policy for engaging North Korea. In
fact, until the last few years of the Bush administration,
it appears that the accepted approach toward North
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Korea was simply to have no meaningful contact at
all with Pyongyang. This apparent lack of a coherent
policy approach only served to limit further the U.S.
ability to influence events both in North Korea and on
the Korean Peninsula.
For much of the Bush administration, it could be
argued that U.S. actions were focused almost exclusively on isolating North Korea (both diplomatically
and economically) in an effort to prevent the Pyongyang regime from developing a nuclear capability.
The administration’s policy had four major elements:
1. An immediate North Korean commitment to
dismantle nuclear weapons facilities;
2. No direct negotiations until North Korea dismantled all nuclear weapons facilities;
3. Isolation of North Korea through economic sanctions; and,
4. Encouraging regime change in North Korea.3
The Bush administration seemed to feel that simply by isolating North Korea and refusing to negotiate
in any meaningful way, the Pyongyang regime would
eventually come to its senses and give up its nuclear
ambitions.
Unfortunately, this strategy of emphasizing isolation over meaningful engagement with Pyongyang
only played into the hands of the North Korean leadership. First, North Korea was, and currently remains,
one of the most isolated countries in the world, by
its own leadership’s choice. There has been virtually
nothing the United States could do to further isolate
the country. In fact, this policy of nonengagement
only made it easier for the Pyongyang regime to keep
its people isolated and cut off from the outside world.
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Second, U.S. calls for military action aimed at regime change only made it easier for the North Korean
propaganda machine to emphasize U.S. aggressive
and potentially threatening actions. This, in turn,
made it even more important for the Korean People’s
Army (KPA, or the North Korean Army) to be ready
to repel an invasion. Finally, U.S. calls for regime
change in Pyongyang and discussion of the North Korean people’s desire for democracy showed a failure
by U.S. policymakers to understand the nature of the
North Korean people and North Korean leadership.
DEFINING THE UNITED STATES POLICY GOAL
While the basic U.S. policy goal for the region has
been peace, security, and stability on the Korean Peninsula, each U.S. presidential administration has defined this goal in its own way. In 2000, the final Clinton
administration National Security Strategy (NSS) stated,
“We must enhance cooperation with South Korea as
we encourage North Korea’s emergence from isolation
and continue to diminish the missile threat.”4 It also
devoted a whole section to a detailed U.S. strategy for
the Korean Peninsula and support for reunification of
the two Koreas.
In 2002, the Bush administration’s first NSS approached the Korean issue from a different perspective. It emphasized the threat posed by North Korea’s
weapons proliferation and nuclear development activities. The strategy also emphasized working with
South Korea to contribute to broader security in the
region and overall stability on the Korean Peninsula.5
In 2006, the final Bush administration NSS focused
on ending tyranny in North Korea; ending the threat
it posed with its nuclear weapons development pro-
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gram; and on sharing South Korea’s vision of a prosperous, democratic, and united Korean Peninsula.6
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NORTH
KOREA
The Bush administration entered office in 2001 convinced that the Clinton administration had given too
much to North Korea in the 1994 Agreed Framework
without ensuring a verifiable reduction of the threat
posed by its nuclear weapons development program.7
As a result, upon assuming office, President Bush ordered an immediate halt to all high-level U.S. Government contacts with North Korea. He also called for a
complete review of U.S. policy toward North Korea
at the same time. In effect, all movement on the 1994
Agreed Framework and all official U.S. Government
contact with North Korea was stopped, pending the
administration’s review of the policy. South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung was also told that the United
States would no longer support his ongoing reconciliation efforts with North Korea.
President Bush announced completion of the
policy review on June 6, 2001. The new U.S. policy
called for a “comprehensive approach,” addressing
verifiable constraints on North Korean missile development, less-threatening conventional forces, and
improved human rights conditions in North Korea.8
The new approach, however, required North Korea to
take serious steps to improve relations with the United States first. Then and only then would the United
States move forward with any new initiatives. However, North Korea was not seen as a high priority for
the Bush administration. The War on Terrorism and
events in Afghanistan and Iraq were more critical to
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U.S. security. Essentially, President Bush and his advisors seemed to feel that it was easier to simply wait
North Korea out than deal with Pyongyang directly.
Between 2001 and 2002, there was virtually no official U.S. Government contact with North Korea other
than through the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing
Personnel Office (DPMO). This office was negotiating
for access to U.S. Korean War loss sites in North Korea
and conducting limited remains-recovery operations
inside North Korea.9
Throughout 2001, U.S. contact with North Korea
continued to deteriorate. Following September 11, 2001
(9/11), President Bush included North Korea along
with Iran and Iraq as part of the “axis of evil” in his
2002 State of the Union speech. While this might have
made good imagery for the American public recovering from the 9/11 attacks, it had serious consequences
for the administration’s efforts to influence events on
the Korean Peninsula. Not only did the idea of North
Korea being part of the “axis of evil” further raise concerns in North Korea that the United States ultimately
intended to attack; it also complicated South Korea’s
relationship with North. It also tied the hands of the
United States in terms of any movement forward on
relations with the North. This speech was followed
with the release of the first Bush administration NSS
in September 2002. This document emphasized preemptive action against rogue states and mentioned
both Iraq and North Korea by name.
Between 2001 and 2006, U.S. policy toward North
Korea focused on isolating the regime and eliminating
the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Specifically, the policy called for: 10
1. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea
through regional discussions;
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2. Nonproliferation of technology or weapons by
North Korea;
3. Reduction or elimination of trafficking by North
Korea of illegal drugs, counterfeit currency, and other
contraband;
4. Maintaining U.S. military forces in South Korea
and Japan as a credible military deterrent to North Korean aggression;
5. Implementing fully the UN sanctions to penalize
and isolate the North Korean regime;
6. Keeping North Korea on the list of terrorist/
terrorist-supporter states; and,
7. Continuing to keep North Korea from becoming
a member of international financial institutions.
As a result of this policy, few actions were taken by
the Bush administration to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and virtually no official U.S. Government contact occurred between the United States and
North Korea. As tension with North Korea continued
to increase, the Bush administration made its first
high-level contact with North Korea in October 2002
when Undersecretary of State James Kelly traveled to
Pyongyang in order to discuss North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development, arms
exports, and human rights issues. During the meeting, Kelly accused North Korea of having an enriched
uranium program and later claimed that the North
Koreans admitted to it when he made the charge.11
Although the North Korean government claimed that
it only stated that as a sovereign state it had the right
to have nuclear weapons, the situation continued to
deteriorate.
By mid-October 2002, senior administration officials were calling the 1994 Agreed Framework dead,
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and in November, the United States reached an agreement with South Korea and Japan to suspend the
heavy-fuel-oil deliveries to North Korea that were
required by the 1994 Agreed Framework. Shortly after this action, North Korea declared that the Agreed
Framework had collapsed and that resulting energy
shortages had forced it to restart operations at the
country’s nuclear facilities, which had been closed in
1994. In December 2003, North Korea requested that
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remove its locks and cameras from declared nuclear
facilities and announced that it intended to expel the
IAEA inspectors by the end of the year. On January 10,
2003, North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
As the standoff worsened, China began taking
steps to bring the countries together. The so-called
Six-Party Talks, consisting of China, Japan, Russia,
South Korea, North Korea, and the United States,
were agreed to in 2003. The first round of these talks
was held in Beijing, China, in August 2003. However,
little progress was made during the initial talks. Four
more rounds of talks took place between 2003 and July
2005, when they became totally deadlocked over the
nuclear weapons development issue. As a result, no
further meetings were held in 2005 or 2006.
On July 4, 2006, North Korea test fired several missiles, one of which was believed to be a Taepo Dong
2.12 Although the flight appeared to have been terminated due to a problem, North Korea had made the
point to the world that it was moving forward with
its missile development program. Then, on October 9,
2006, North Korea announced that it had conducted
an underground test of a nuclear weapon. This test
was confirmed several days later by U.S. intelligence,
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which believed the size of the explosion to be less than
1 kiloton (kt).13
Figure 2-1 shows a graphic example of the range
capabilities of the various North Korean missiles.
Most significant is the fact that, the North Korean Taepo Dong 2 is capable of reaching Alaska and the continental United States.

Note: North Korean Advisory Group Report to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. Available from www.house.gov/
international_relations/nkag/report.htm.

Figure 2-1. Potential North Korean Long-Range
Missile Capabilities.
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By early 2007, China was making a renewed push
to restart the Six-Party Talks. By this time, the Republican Party had suffered a major defeat in the 2006
congressional elections, and there was a new national
security team, with a new Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, and National Security Advisor. With this
new team, there appeared to be a realization that a shift
in policy was needed. The U.S. negotiator with North
Korea, Ambassador Christopher Hill, returned to Beijing with a more open attitude and what appeared to
be more flexibility. Within a short period, North Korea
agreed to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility, allow IAEA inspections, and provide information on its
nuclear programs. In return, the United States agreed
to begin bilateral talks with North Korea aimed at
moving toward eventual establishment of diplomatic
relations with North Korea, removal of North Korea
from the list of states sponsoring terrorism, ending
trade restrictions, and providing energy assistance.
Despite several delays in the process, North Korea
did finally shut down and destroy the reactor at Yongbyon on June 28, 2008. It also eventually provided a
large amount of information on its nuclear programs.
The United States removed North Korea from the list
of nations sponsoring terrorism, provided limited energy and food assistance, and began the process of lifting trade restrictions. However, following Kim Jong
Il’s apparent stroke in August 2008 and the change in
governments in both Seoul and Washington at the end
of 2008, North Korea has again returned to a hard line
and is resisting IAEA inspections and threatening renewed missile and weapons tests.
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NORTH KOREA
Most North Koreans have known only two leaders in their lives. The first is Kim Il Sung (see Figure
2.2), the “Great Leader,” who is credited with defeating both the Japanese in World War II and the United
States in the Korean War, and thereby liberating their
country.14 To the North Koreans, in a country virtually without religion, he was and remains their “god”
and a person who could do no wrong.15 The second
is his son, Kim Jong Il, known as the “Dear Leader,”
or more recently the “Great General,” who is credited
with rebuilding Pyongyang as a showcase city. To
the North Koreans, he is the “son of god” and their
guiding light.16 North Koreans are taught from a very
young age that they owe everything they have to Kim
Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Note: The Books in the Painting are the Works of Kim Il Sung.
(Author’s Collection.)

Figure 2-2. North Korean Painting Extolling the
Greatness of Kim Il Sung.
14

According to Scott Snyder of the United States Institute of Peace,
Perhaps the most unique, pervasive, and—or to the
outside observer—incomprehensible aspect of North
Korea’s socialization process is the all-encompassing
role played by Kim Il Sung, who arguably continues
to be the ruling figure—the “Eternal President”—in
North Korea even after his death. Kim Il Sungism may
have more in common with religions than with other
communist regimes. And, like many strong faiths, it
feeds on a form of aggrieved nationalism. . . . Once
said by Kim, it is said forever. Nobody is allowed to
change anything. . . . The durability of Kim’s cult of
personality even after his death is so powerful that it
cannot be discarded lightly. . . .17

In the end, both North Korea and its leaders have
proved to be amazingly resilient. Kim Jong Il shrewdly ensured that the KPA was fed and supported with
his “Army First” policy.18 This focus on taking care of
the Army provided him a strong base of support for
his power. Additionally, the majority of North Korean
generals and senior officers today owe their promotions directly to him. He further consolidated his position by continuing to emphasize the threat posed by
the United States and successfully maintained his control over the country despite the numerous economic
and social problems.
The North Korean Economy.
Economically, North Korea continues to be affected in four areas: economic reform, periodic food shortages, public infrastructure, and the medical system.
In July 2002, Pyongyang began a series of significant
15

economic reforms by cutting government subsidies on
certain things and essentially allowing people to start
limited private businesses. This economic openness
has gradually led to a situation in which some North
Korean individuals are becoming increasingly more
interested in making money than in working for the
state. The economic reforms included the following
measures: 19
1. Official prices and wages were increased to
bring them closer to the black market levels. As part
of this program, food, fuel and electricity, and public
transport prices all increased significantly;
2. Wage levels were raised to meet increased prices, with soldiers, miners, and scientists receiving the
largest increase;
3. Land was de-collectivized, with farmers having
the right to sell excess produce;
4. The North Korean won was devalued from its
artificially high rate of 2.15 to the U.S. dollar to 150
North Korean won to the U.S. dollar;
5. Managerial decisions for industry and agriculture were removed from the political decisionmaking
process;
6. Government subsidies were cut, and hard budget constraints imposed on enterprises. Enterprises
now had to cover their own expenses; and,
7. All enterprises were authorized to sell their surplus goods on the open market.
North Korea continues to suffer from serious food
shortages and periodic natural disasters. Most notably,
periodic flooding has further damaged or destroyed
the limited food supplies available. A recent report
indicated high levels of malnourishment among the
population. Food shortages appear to be so severe that
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some reports indicate that they are starting to impact
on the military. Figure 2-3 shows the major areas of
malnutrition and food shortages in North Korea, the
worst being in the Northeast region of the country.20
This figure also shows the level of food aid, in thousands of metric tons, the United States has continued
to provide to North Korea.

Figure 2-3. Areas of Malnutrition/Food Shortages
in North Korea.
The public infrastructure, particularly the condition of railroads, highways, and bridges, is significantly deteriorating, making cross-country transportation difficult. Most factories are not functioning due
to aging equipment or they are only functioning on a
limited basis due to frequent power outages throughout the country. The North Korean medical system is
also nearing collapse, and there are reports of increasing rates of tuberculosis. Medical equipment is old or
nonexistent, and medicines are becoming increasingly
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difficult to obtain. However, the elite in Pyongyang
are still able to receive relatively decent medical care.
While there appears to be an awareness of the need
for economic reforms by the North Korean leadership,
there also appears to be an understanding of the risks
posed by too rapid a change. According to Dr. Andrew Scobell,
North Korea’s rulers—or at least some of them—appear to be acutely aware of the dilemma they face. On
the one hand, they seem to recognize that, on the surface of it, the most logical way to rescue their economy
is to adopt thoroughgoing reforms. On the other hand,
they seem to realize that pursuing such a course is
likely to mean that they would be undermining their
positions in the process—threatening their own power
and control. Such reforms might be so successful that
after gathering momentum, the regime would eventually find itself reformed out of existence.21

Why Is North Korea Developing Nuclear Weapons?
While it is difficult to really know the rationale
of the Pyongyang leadership for developing nuclear
weapons, much less admitting to having a nuclear
weapons program, there are several possible explanations. Their motives seem to stem mostly from a need
to have something dramatic that focuses U.S. attention on North Korea. The reasons include: 22
1. The rapidly deteriorating economic and political
situation in the North.
2. The concern by Pyongyang that as part of the
“axis of evil” they would be next in line for regime
change after Iraq.
3. A possible deliberate action to exploit the anxieties of the United States and its allies about Pyongyang’s recklessness by behaving in a manner intended
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to exacerbate these apprehensions. Essentially, using
the U.S. fear of a possible North Korean nuclear threat
to bring about the start of serious negotiations.
A similar analysis comes from a Chinese delegation from the Shanghai Institute during a visit to the
University of California (Los Angeles):
According to the delegates, the admission (of its nuclear development program) is North Korea’s way of
opening the door for dialogue with the United States.
From the North Korean perspective, to develop relations with the United States it is necessary first to get
the attention of the United States. North Korea’s admission has certainly assured that it (along with Iraq) has
moved front-and-center on the foreign policy agenda
in Washington. Moreover, North Korea has few cards
to play in its relationship with the U.S. North Korea
has chosen to play the nuclear card because it wants
to reach an understanding—a compromise, in other
words—with the United States.23

Critics will argue that the North Korean regime is
unstable and not capable of coming up with such a
long-range plan of action. However, North Korea did
successfully manage to refocus U.S. attention on it
and saw the Six-Party Talks resume, with the United
States taking a more flexible approach. It is important
to note that Pyongyang has a record of diplomatic
brinkmanship in its dealings with the West. Even in
the Department of Defense negotiations for access to
possible U.S. missing personnel loss sites in North
Korea, the North Korean negotiators will take the discussion to the point of having the talks break down,
only to eventually return to the table when they have
found the U.S. negotiators’ limits. These actions by
North Korea would appear to be less the actions of an
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irrational actor than a deliberate effort to find the U.S.
bottom line in an attempt soften the U.S. negotiators
and get the most possible from the United States.
To some extent, the North Korean leadership is
perhaps a victim of its Cold War negotiating successes. While current situation in the North leaves
the country no choice but to negotiate for assistance,
North Korea has failed to adapt to these new conditions by modifying its negotiation style. According to
Scott Snyder,
The rigidity of the DPRK’s Stalinist institutional structure has inhibited flexibility at the negotiation table
and has tied the hands of North Korea’s negotiating
representatives, who have relatively little authority
to make concessions without the direct approval of
North Korea’s top leadership.24

Critics also point to the North Korean WMD development program and its recent missile tests as examples of Pyongyang’s direct challenge and threats to
the West. However, a closer look at the North Korean
program seems to show that North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development program and recent missile
firing may have less to do with preparations to launch
an attack (or even to defend themselves) than they
do with the Pyongyang regime’s efforts to get the attention of the new U.S. President. A recent article by
CNN’s Christiana Amanpour discusses three possible
reasons behind the latest missile launch by Pyongyang. According to her:
Analysts believe North Korea and its leader Kim JongIl conducted the launch for several reasons, including
showing off its missile capability to potential buyers,
showing off its capability to its own citizens ahead of
a rubber-stamp parliamentary session this week in
Pyongyang where the leader will be installed again by
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acclamation, and finally that Pyongyang conducted
the launch as a way of attracting the attention of the
Obama administration to focus again on the six-party
talks on its nuclear disarmament.25

The Threat from North Korea.
As stated above, it appears much of North Korea’s
efforts in developing nuclear weapons and missiles
have been aimed at gaining U.S. attention, rather than
developing an offensive capability to launch a war.
There appears to be little likelihood that North Korea
would use its nuclear or conventional military capability to launch a first-strike attack against the United
States or any other nation in the region. The North
Korean leadership seems to understand that any attack on the United States or its allies would be suicide
and would ultimately destroy the regime, which is the
very thing they seek to preserve. According to Dr. Scobell,
The North Korean leadership probably believes that
in any major force-on-force conflict with the United
States the Korean People’s Army would be defeated,
leading to the collapse or overthrow of the regime. The
clearest indication of this fear and the existence of this
logic in the north is that, for more than half a century,
Pyongyang has not launched an attack southward
across the DMZ.26

The North Korean government has stated that it
would use force only to defend itself and would not
launch a first strike. The danger is that should Pyongyang feel that an attack on its territory is imminent,
it may indeed launch such a strike to defend itself.
Another important consideration is that North Korea
views South Koreans as one people with the North.
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The North Korean leadership appears to be fully
aware of the South’s economic potential. Although
Pyongyang has made aggressive threats toward the
United States, it has not directly threatened an attack
on the South since the early 1990s, and it is unlikely to
launch a military strike simply to reunify the country
by force, given Seoul’s current efforts to increase economic support to Pyongyang and the limited ability of
the North Korean military to sustain an attack on the
South. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of further military incidents involving North and
South Korean forces.
So what, then, is the real threat from the North?
The primary threat North Korea poses to the United
States and regional security derives more from its illicit activities rather than the use of military force. While
there remains a potential for the North to launch an
attack through misunderstanding, fear that it is about
to be attacked, or in an effort to prevent total collapse,
the larger threats stem from the potential proliferation
of North Korean missile or WMD technology to other
countries or terrorist organizations. Additionally,
North Korean efforts to gain hard currency through
counterfeiting U.S. dollars or narcotics trafficking pose
significant problems for the international community.
Finally, North Korean human rights abuses and the
ongoing refugee problem are having a significant impact on China and South Korea in particular.
CONCLUSION
Rather than advancing relations through a policy
of engagement designed to increase U.S. ability to influence Pyongyang, the Bush administration chose a
policy of nonengagement and isolation, which only
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served to limit the U.S. ability to both understand
events inside of North Korea and to work productively with Pyongyang. It was not until the final 2 years
of the administration that it appears a concerted effort
was made to move toward a solution on the North Korean problem. However, as a result of the initial lack of
progress, the Obama administration today finds itself
faced with a North Korea that has a limited nuclear
capability and continues to have little contact with
the outside world. We have limited ability to gain an
understanding of internal developments in the North
and no clear policy for engaging Pyongyang or ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula after Kim Jong
Il dies.
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CHAPTER 3
THE REGIONAL INTERESTS AND CULTURAL
VIEWS
South-North relations should be resolved smoothly with
a more flexible and mature attitude. Last year marked
the 60th anniversary of national division. It is about time
the South and North overcame confrontation and conflict
and opened a new age of cooperative coexistence and coprosperity. I hope that North Korea will be able to read
the change of the times and forge ahead with us for a
bright future.
		
		

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak
January 2, 20091

INTRODUCTION
In looking at the Korean Peninsula through the
framework of the Interagency Conflict Management
Strategy Model, we must consider the national interests and views of the United States, both North and
South Korea, and the three key regional powers in
northeast Asia: China, Russia, and Japan. Each country has specific national interests and concerns that
will affect U.S. strategy and planning.
This chapter will first address U.S. national interests and perspectives on the Korean Peninsula. It will
then look at the strategic interests of the key U.S. regional partners: China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Finally, it will address North Korea and its goals,
its interests and the cultural influences on Pyongyang.
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UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL INTERESTS
The United States.
The guiding principle for the United States in dealing with North Korea is to maintain a stable Korean
Peninsula where people live in peace without the
threat of war. In order to accomplish this goal, the specific U.S. national interests in relation to North Korea
have included:
1. Eliminating all North Korean development and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
2. Reducing the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula;
3. Curtailing various illegal North Korean activities such as counterfeiting of currency and international weapons sales; and,
4. Weakening the regime or promoting regime
change.
Much of the challenge faced by the United States
in dealing with North Korea is the result of U.S. policymakers having limited knowledge and experience
with North Korea and its people. There is little opportunity for travel to North Korea by Americans, no diplomatic relations or trade between the United States
and North Korea, and no regular ongoing official U.S.
contact. As a result of this lack of direct knowledge,
it is very easy for U.S. policymakers to superimpose
their own concept of the world on North Korea. Three
examples of this come to mind. First, the widely held
U.S. presumption that Kim Jong Il is an irrational and
perhaps unstable leader. This notion appears to be
anything but true.2
Second, the notion that North Koreans fear the
Pyongyang regime and are waiting for any opportu28

nity to overthrow it. Clearly, this concept shows a lack
of understanding of the “god-like” status of both Kim
Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, as discussed in Chapter 2. This
notion also shows an incomplete understanding of the
personal dynamics within North Korea, where the
people are heavily influenced by the Confucian tradition of authority. Any indication of negative opinion
toward the regime could lead to immediate negative
consequences for both the individual involved and
their family. This environment leaves little opportunity for any movement against the regime to develop.
Moreover, there is no known indication of any organized internal threat to the Pyongyang regime.
Third, there is the often-stated idea that regime
change is needed because North Koreans have a desire
for democracy. This overlooks the fact that North Koreans have no real concept of democracy. The North
Koreans have never experienced life in a democracy.
REGIONAL STRATEGIC CONCERNS
China.

Map 3-1. Regional Map of China.3
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China has a unique relationship with North Korea.
As Pyongyang’s only remaining Cold War ally, China
has the closest relationship with North Korea of any of
the countries in the region. This relationship goes back
to the common bond they shared in fighting Japanese
imperialism during World War II and Beijing’s support of North Korea’s fight against the United States
in the Korean War. Of all nations in the region, China
seems to be able to exert the most influence on North
Korea. China’s guiding principle regarding North Korea has been the maintenance of regional stability.
China has repeatedly stated three long-held principles that guide its policy toward the Korean Peninsula:3
1. The Korean Peninsula should be free of nuclear
weapons;
2. Regional peace and stability must be maintained;
and
3. The situation should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation.
From the perspective of the Chinese leadership,
the most critical priorities for their country’s policy
toward North Korea are to:
1. Avoid the economic costs of an explosion on the
Korean Peninsula;
2. Prevent the United States from dominating a
unified Korea;
3. Secure the stability of its three economically
weak northeastern provinces;4
4. Reduce the financial burden of their bilateral relationship with North Korea;
5. Be seen in a positive light for playing a major
role in the denuclearization of the peninsula;
6. Use the situation in North Korea to leverage the
United States on the issue of Taiwan; and,
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7. Avoid North Korean situations that may provoke Japan to seek to be a nuclear power.5
China, along with the other countries in the region,
is also acutely aware that a major event in Pyongyang
could lead to a significant refugee crisis that affects the
entire region.6 Thus far, Beijing has been reluctant to
discuss openly or participate in any potential planning
for a possible collapse of the North Korean regime.
Beijing may be concerned about alienating Pyongyang. Beijing’s attitude may also be partly due to its
long-standing policy of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other countries. While Beijing, on occasion,
has shown a degree of frustration with recent actions
by Pyongyang, it continues to support the regime. In
fact, China continues to be Pyongyang’s major trading
partner, accounting for more than 40 percent of North
Korea’s trade.7
Finally, China’s conflicting regional, domestic, and
international priorities make it unlikely that Beijing
could be relied upon to force North Korea into any negotiations. It is also possible that Beijing may prefer to
maintain a divided Korean Peninsula out of fear that
a unified Korea may lead to greater instability in the
region. Strategically, North Korea is currently a buffer
between China and the democratic influence of Japan
and South Korea. A collapse of the communist regime
in Pyongyang could have a destabilizing effect on the
northeastern Chinese regions. Also, the reunification
of Korea would require a large investment by South
Korea. This scenario is likely to reduce resources available for continued South Korean investment in China.
China currently is the only country able to exert any
influence on the Pyongyang regime. A unified Korea,
aligned with the United States, would almost com-
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pletely reduce any significant influence China might
have over the Korean government.
Japan.
Events on the Korean Peninsula will have a major
impact on Japanese security and prosperity going forward. As Tokyo is within range of North Korean missiles, Japan is deeply concerned about the potential for
conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Economically, Japan
could potentially benefit from trade relations with the
North and access to raw materials. However, Tokyo
has had a very difficult history with the region. There
is a deep historical mistrust between Japan and Korea. The North Koreans have a long painful memory
of their nearly half-century of life under Japanese
imperial rule between 1905 and 1945. In many ways,
the North Koreans dislike and fear the Japanese even
more than they do the Americans.8
Japan’s guiding principle and ideal is a unified Korea aligned with the United States rather than China,
one that shares the political values of democracy, rule
of law and a free market economy. Because of the historical mistrust between Korea and Japan, a key policy
consideration from the Japanese perspective is an understanding that a unified Korea not aligned with the
United States might be inclined to expand its military
capabilities and eventually pose a threat to the Japanese territory and security.
Russia.
Russia is also concerned about regional stability.
However, Moscow is also looking for an opportunity
to reverse its loss of influence in the region since the
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fall of Communism. Economically, Moscow can gain
significantly from access to warm water ports and
the increased demand for Russian goods and energy
resources that development in North Korea would
bring.
The worst-case scenario for Russia would be a
nationalist unified Korea closely aligned with China.
Such a scenario would significantly limit Russia’s influence and hinder its ability to develop oil and gas
pipelines throughout the region. As a result, Russia is
likely to support a unified Korea aligned toward the
United States, along with a denuclearization of the
peninsula.
South Korea.
The Seoul government is probably in the most
complicated situation of all the countries in the region.
While South Korea supports unification, the situation
in the North potentially presents significant opportunities and tremendous burdens. The guiding principle
for the Seoul government is the desire for regional stability and security. One key concern is the potential
for conflict with the North. Seoul also worries that a
hard collapse of North Korea would lead to an internal crisis. In addition, any drastic change in the North
could ignite a massive refugee flow south. Finally,
Seoul faces the looming challenge of providing sufficient economic and security aid to stabilize one of the
most economically backward and politically isolated
countries in the world. There is a very real possibility
that Seoul could be quickly overwhelmed by any of
these situations.9
Over the last 20 years, South Korean policy toward
North Korea has varied considerably. Each South Korean government has had its own approach.
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1. Early 1990s—Kim Young Sam’s—”Soft Landing
Policy.” This policy emphasized providing assistance
to North Korea in anticipation of an eventual collapse
of the country following Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994.
This very public anticipation of North Korea’s collapse prevented any real movement forward in interKorean relations.
2. 1998-2002—Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.”
This policy marked a radical shift in South Korean
strategy toward the North. It effectively separated economic issues from political issues. This policy, among
other things, brought about a wide range of interKorean economic and cultural exchanges. However, it
also saw little forward movement in inter-Korean relations because it did not address security confidencebuilding measures, and most of the exchanges were
one way, from South to North.
3. 2002-07—Roh Moo-Hyun’s “Peace and Prosperity Policy.” This policy, built on previous efforts
to promote inter-Korean reconciliation, was an effort
to overhaul the “Sunshine Policy.” However, it also
failed because of the deepening domestic political
divisions in South Korea over North Korean policy
and concerns for the meager returns that had been
achieved.
4. 2009 to the present—Lee Myung-Bak’s “Denuclearization First Policy.” The first 18 months of
the Lee Myung-Bak administration saw a progressive worsening of inter-Korean relations. In 2009, he
proposed a policy that emphasized “one-step denuclearization” in return for massive incentives. These
incentives included security guarantees and foreign
assistance.
Seoul is very much aware of the economic investment potential in North Korea. Much of the South Ko34

rean efforts have focused on preparing to capitalize
on this potential for economic opportunity in North
Korea. The South Korean government has also used
its economic leverage and family reunions to open
channels of communication with the North Koreans.10
North Korea.
North Korea’s primary goal and guiding principle
has always been the preservation of the regime. It also
wants to obtain sufficient economic and energy assistance to avoid starvation and other health problems.
In addition to being recognized as a nuclear power,
North Korea has consistently stated that it would like
to see a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue, based
on four conditions:11
1. U.S. recognition of North Korean sovereignty
and noninterference in its internal affairs;
2. A nonaggression agreement with the United
States;
3. Removal from the U.S. list of states sponsoring
international terrorism;12 and,
4. Noninterference by the United States in North
Korea’s economic development.
Additionally, North Korea has stated its desire
for continued U.S. support of Korean unification, although not necessarily in the same form that South
Korea envisions. Although there are similarities between the concepts of North and South Korea, there
are also significant differences. North Korea has generally mentioned unification with a federation-type
structure having a rotating leader. Under this concept,
both North and South Korea would maintain their own
government and economic structures.13 Kim Il Sung
provided the details for this concept for unification in
his Report to the Sixth Congress of the Worker’s Party
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of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee on October 10, 1980.14 The North’s federation is composed of
one nation, one state, two governments, and two systems, whereas the South’s confederation is composed
of one nation, two states, two governments, and two
systems. Essentially, both unification concepts comprise two regional governments with different political and economic systems.15

Note: Map 3-2 illustrates the U.S., North Korean, and South Korean forces on the Korean Peninsula. It is intended to show a comparison of the forces facing each other. This map also illustrates
the pattern of reduction in U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula
since the end of the Korean War. A further, more detailed comparison of the military forces of North and South Korea can be
found in Appendix 2.

Map 3-2. Comparison of North and South Korean
Military Forces.
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THE NORTH KOREAN CULTURAL ASPECT
In order to understand North Korean society, it is
also important to understand the role that Confucian
values have had on the society. According to Selig
Harrison, Director of the Century Foundation’s Project on the United States and the Future of Korea, “The
ideal leader in Confucian ethos rules through the moral power of his exemplary behavior and the wisdom
of his teachings, not through brutal coercion. Wisdom
is handed down from the leader to the people, who
learn what is ‘correct’ through the rote mastery of the
truth.”16 Kim Il Sung, and later Kim Jong Il, were both
able to successfully build on these Confucian ideals
and virtues. Through the Confucian ideals, there was
a built-in readiness within the Korean society for voluntary acceptance of strong authoritarian rule.
Another writer, Suk Hi Kim, editor of the North Korean Review, described the impact of Confucian traditions on North Korean society in this way:
Despite a half century of Marxism, North Korea still
consciously appropriates the powerful Confucian
traditions of political centralization and obedience to
authority that date back more than 6 centuries. The
Confucian philosophy teaches that each person has
his place in a hierarchical social order and that the
preservation of harmony within the social order is of
paramount importance. . . . (Both) Kim Il Sung and
Kim Jong Il have consciously attempted to wrap themselves in the mantle of Confucian virtues. Thus, North
Korea’s tightly controlled system has lasted longer
than any other 20th Century dictatorhip.17
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Figure 3-1. North Korean Propaganda Image of Kim
Jong Il Briefing Senior North Korean Military
Leaders While Kim Il Sung Looks On.
(Author’s Collection.)
Influence of Juche on North Korean Society.
It is difficult to overestimate the role that the principle of Juche, or self-reliance, has played on the attitudes of North Koreans toward their country and
leaders. The concept of Juche was first introduced by
Sin Chae Ho, a Korean nationalist, in the early-20th
century. Kim Il Sung ultimately made the concept a
nationalist ideology, which eventually became the basis for the existence of North Korea. It was later transformed into a cult ideology by Kim Jong Il. Juche is
constantly repeated in schools and the media and has
come to be a powerful influence on North Koreans,
emphasizing national self-reliance, independence,
and the worship of the supreme leader. According to
Suk Hi Kim, in his recent book, North Korea at a Crossroads,
As Juche developed, the principle addressed several
major issues. First, it served to maintain North Korea’s
independence. . . . Second, it also modeled North Kore38

ans into ever-loyal disciples of the leader. . . . Third, it
glorified the solidarity of the people as a modern Confucian family around the party and its leader. Fourth,
it defended the North Korean brand of socialism in the
face of ever declining living standards. . . . Finally, . . .
it gave the people a reason to live, even die for the
regime. It seems that most people support the idea of
Juche as a principle of national sovereignty, pride, and
self-sufficiency.18

Potential for Open Rebellion to Develop in North
Korea.
There must be a shared grievance needing correction by a changing society for change to occur. In fact,
because of their extreme isolation from the outside
world and the political repression that North Koreans have faced, most North Koreans do not even realize that they have any grievances (other than those
against the United States and Japan). At least, it does
not appear that they have any open grievances against
the North Korean government. There has been little
opportunity for any social movement to develop within North Korea. However, this could change with a
precipitating event, such as the death of Kim Jong Il or
an increased openness in North Korea.
Openness and democracy are double-edged
swords with North Korea. As North Korea becomes
more open to the outside world, restrictions on the
population may gradually lift, and as more North Koreans begin to see and understand what the outside
world is really like, grievances are likely to develop
among the population. This will be particularly true
as the North Koreans feel they have more freedom
to express themselves without retribution. How the
government handles these grievances is likely to de-
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termine whether or not the people will feel their grievances are being met. If the people feel grievances are
not being met, they will move through this initial stage
and begin violent actions toward the government.
CONCLUSION
The overall strategic concerns of China, Japan,
Russia, and South Korea are focused around four key
regional security issues:
1. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons on the
Korean Peninsula;
2. The potential for massive refugee flow were
North Korea to collapse;
3. The potential for economic opportunity inside
North Korea; and,
4. The potential security implications of a reunified
Korea.
Each of these issues could cause potential problems
throughout the region. China, in particular, is acutely
aware of the potential refugee problems and the impact that these problems might have on Chinese territory. South Korea, on the other hand, is significantly
focused on the potential for economic opportunity in
North Korea. Japan is acutely focused on security concerns evolving from a spread of nuclear weapons to
the Korean Peninsula. North Korea remains focused
on preservation of the regime.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPING A STRATEGY
Dealing with North Korea is perhaps one of the most difficult security challenges in global politics today. Totalitarian and reclusive, ideologically isolated and economically ruined, it is the inherent ‘other’ in a globalized and
neoliberal world order.
		
		
		

Roland Bleiker
Author of “Divided North Korea:
Toward a Culture of Reconciliation1

INTRODUCTION
Clearly, there are significant differences between
North and South Korea that were not present between
East and West Germany in 1990. Among these differences is the fact that, unlike the North Koreans, the
East Germans were not completely isolated from the
outside world. They had an awareness of the world
around them, understood democracy, and wanted
unification to occur. In the case of North Korea, the
population as a whole knows little about South Korea
and even less about the outside world. Although the
Pyongyang leadership talks about potential unification in positive terms, it is not clear what its reaction
would be to unification if the South Korean government were in a leadership role.
Two other very important differences between
North Korea and East Germany are: first, the lack of
any real middle class in North Korea. In the case of
East Germany, it was the middle class frustration with
the pace of reform that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall
and collapse of the communist system. Second, un-
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like East Germany, North Korea possesses a nuclear
capability. This North Korean nuclear capability significantly changes the political and security dynamics
of the Korean Peninsula and may require different actions to ensure safety and security.
Despite these differences, there are many areas
where we can learn from the German example. In the
case of the German Reunification, the United States
and regional powers played a major role in setting
the conditions for a peaceful reunification. In the Korean case, first and foremost, the Obama administration must determine the U.S. strategy for dealing with
North Korea and its potential collapse. The administration must determine how the U.S. Government sees
the Korean Peninsula evolving over the coming decade
if we want to have any impact on shaping the future
events in the region. U.S. strategy must also consider
the broader strategic environment in the region, particularly China’s role as a key player in northeast Asia
and a potential supporter or detractor of U.S. strategy.
Furthermore, strategy should center on South Korea
as being the legitimate Korean government and provide support for the peaceful unification of North and
South Korea. The key U.S. goal should be peaceful
reunification with stability, both on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.
Much as was done in the case of the German Reunification, the Obama administration will need to
embark on a period of public diplomacy to sell the
strategy, both to the American public and U.S. regional partners. Policymakers must understand that we
will not be able to accomplish any of the U.S. strategic
goals toward the Korean Peninsula without the active
support of China and Russia. We can help ease Chinese security fears and gain China’s cooperation by
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working with Beijing to address and reduce these concerns. One possible approach would be to indicate that
no U.S. troops would enter North Korea unless the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula required
U.S. troops. In the case of Russia, we can help gain
its support by addressing its desire to have renewed
influence in the region, and by ensuring Russian concerns are taken into account in any discussions.
In the case of North Korea, we must keep in mind
that, despite all the hardships and difficulties it has
suffered, its population is a proud people. They have
been taught since they were very young that they have
accomplished much, and they believe it. We must treat
North Korea as we would any other country. Therefore, any U.S. policy should emphasize engagement
with North Korea first and foremost. This engagement should include discussions, negotiations, cultural exchanges, and even diplomatic relations. Only
by engaging North Korea will we begin to understand
each other, and only then will we have some level of
positive influence on them.2 We must work within the
context of maintaining flexibility so that neither side
loses “face” in discussions. We must also realize that
we cannot expect the North to take positive actions
without giving them something in return.
As Ambassador Charles Pritchard, former U.S.
Special Envoy for Negotiations with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the Clinton
administration, points out in his recent book:
To enter negotiations toward achieving normalization
(with North Korea) requires Washington to make a
strategic decision—which it has not made—to accept
North Korea’s system of government and leadership
much as it has the Chinese, Vietnamese, Russian. . . .
Normalization of relations . . . does require the United
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States to refrain from efforts to change the regime, but
it does not mean . . . forgo(ing) serious engagement on
humanitarian issues and monetary security.3

Although it will be difficult, a policy of actively
engaging North Korea will eventually provide the
United States with a forum to exert a limited degree
of influence on the Pyongyang leadership. It will also
give us a better understanding of what is actually happening inside North Korea. Ultimately, we must keep
in mind that, as in the case of Eastern Europe, events
on the ground are likely to outpace any planning we
do. It will be extremely critical that we have both an
awareness of events as they are occurring and the
flexibility of action to ensure appropriate measured
responses.
DEVELOPING A U.S. STRATEGY
In developing U.S. strategy for the Korean Peninsula, it is essential that we work closely with our
regional partners—China, Russia, South Korea, and
Japan—to develop a common framework for discussion and planning on the future of the peninsula. Ultimately, any U.S. strategy toward North Korea must
include economic, diplomatic, and military elements.
U.S. strategy should be aimed at accomplishing the
transformation of North Korea in three areas:
1. The North Korean perceived threat from the
United States and the West.
2. The nature of the North Korean government and
the ruling regime.
3. The North Korean economic system.
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U.S. policy towards North Korea must also:
1. Recognize that threats of the use of force and no
contact are counterproductive in dealing with North
Korea. One of the most productive things we could do
is reach agreement on ending the armistice from the
Korean War and giving a formal security guarantee
to North Korea tied to nonproliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
2. Restart the Joint U.S.-North Korean Missing In
Action (MIA) discussions and searches inside North
Korea. This will give the United States an opportunity
for formal direct government engagement and contact
with the North Korean military leadership.
3. Look at providing alternative energy sources for
North Korea tied to developing a verifiable limit to
North Korea’s nuclear development in return.
4. Move gradually toward establishing diplomatic
relations with North Korea. Start with a U.S. Interests
section or a Consulate in Pyongyang. Initiate formal
high-level contacts outside the Six-Party Talks and
gradually move toward establishing full diplomatic
relations.
These actions would put us in a position to influence events on the Korean Peninsula and encourage
movement toward a soft collapse. The most difficult
burden, however, will be placed on South Korea, and
we must be prepared to support Seoul politically, financially, and logistically.
The United States must begin working with Seoul
to plan actions that address the security, governance
and participation, economic stabilization and infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and social wellbeing, and justice and reconciliation issues that it will
face in unifying with North Korea. Much will depend
on the political leadership of both U.S. regional part-
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ners and the North. If we are able to successfully influence regional partners to begin moving forward on
unification discussions, then both North and South
Korea should begin serious planning efforts to bring
the two countries together. The most critical consideration will be maintaining stability in the North.
The Obama administration has several specific
policy options to consider in determining its strategy
toward North Korea. Each option carries a degree of
risk.
1. Continue the current U.S. policy toward North
Korea. This includes the use of economic sanctions,
efforts to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear capability,
and emphasis on the Six-Party Talks.
2. Intensify sanctions aimed at forcing North Korean compliance.
3. Move to normalize relations with North Korea,
sign a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War, begin bilateral discussions, and accept that North Korea
will maintain its limited nuclear capability.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Unification of the two Koreas is a long cherished desire of the 70 million Korean people. Inter-Korean relations must become more productive than they are
now. Our attitude will be pragmatic, not ideological.
The core task is to help all Koreans live happily and to
prepare the foundation for unification.
		
		

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak
February 25, 20081

Despite some pronounced differences between
East Germany and North Korea, there are lessons we
can use in planning for a Korean unification. The most
important and critical lesson may be that of the role
of the United States and its allies. The U.S. Government had a strategy for handling German unification
and was able to sell it to the key European nations
and the Soviet Union. The United States does not currently have a strategy or a plan for shaping a Korean
unification and the Korean Peninsula once Kim Jong
Il dies. As a result, the United States has little influence on North Korea and is put in a position of reacting to events rather than shaping them. The Obama
administration has an opportunity to develop such a
plan and begin moving in a direction that will enable
United States to influence events in North Korea in the
coming years.
Internally, the rigid isolation and political indoctrination of the North Korean people make it very unlikely that the German example of a quick takeover would
be successful. In all likelihood, such a takeover would
be likely to meet significant resistance in the North.
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The ideal approach to Korean unification may be a
slower path where the two countries unify under an
overarching political structure, but initially maintain
their own separate political and military structures.
Although slower, such a course may provide for more
stability. Economic and social changes could then be
addressed gradually, while maintaining political and
security stability. As changes took effect, the North
could then gradually be moved closer to the South Korean model. Over a period of time, as economic and
social conditions began to improve, the South Korean
political system could take root in the North, and the
North Korean political and military leadership could
gradually be retired.
The Obama administration has the opportunity to
move toward peace on the Korean Peninsula. To do
this, however, it will have to deal with North Korea
on the same level as it deals with any other country.
First and foremost, U.S. policy must emphasize engagement with Pyongyang. This engagement should
include discussions, negotiations, cultural exchanges,
and even diplomatic relations. As stated previously, we must engage North Korea on multiple levels
if our two nations are to begin to develop a mutual
understanding. This understanding is essential if the
United States is ever to have any positive influence on
Pyongyang. We must also endeavor to remain flexible
to ensure that neither side loses “face” in discussions
and understand that we cannot expect North Korea to
undertake positive actions without giving them something they want in return.
According to Roland Bleiker, a former Swiss diplomat in North Korea, “Dialogue is undoubtedly one
of the most needed and, until recently, least practiced
features that could generate a more peaceful political
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environment in Korea. Dialogue is essential for diffusing tension and preventing the risk of violence.”2
While this may seem counterintuitive to some, we
only need look at the U.S. inability to influence or fully
understand North Korea. It is difficult for any nation
to influence or have an impact on another if it refuses
to engage.
We must also recognize that threats of the use of
force along with no contact are counterproductive in
dealing with North Korea. An agreement on ending
the armistice from the Korean War and giving a formal security guarantee to North Korea is probably one
of the most productive things we can do. Ultimately,
U.S. policy should move gradually toward establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea. While
North Korea’s primary goal is and has been preservation of the regime, the United States can work within
that goal by providing economic and medical assistance. As relations improve, we are likely to gradually
develop a position of some influence over the regime,
much as we have done in China and Vietnam.
North Korea’s leadership has consistently stated
that it would like to see a negotiated solution to the
nuclear issue based on these four conditions:
1. U.S. recognition of North Korean sovereignty;
2. Noninterference in its internal affairs;
3. A nonaggression agreement with the United
States; and,
4. Noninterference by the United States in North
Korea’s economic development.
By engaging with North Korea, we may eventually
be in a position to influence the actions of the North
Korean leadership.
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This is not to suggest that any of this will be easy or
happen quickly. North Korea is a difficult nation with
which to negotiate and often reacts in a manner that
outside observers see as counterproductive. It is also
important to understand that a policy of engagement
is really a double-edged sword for the North Korean
leadership. North Korea’s biggest weakness may, in
fact, be opening up to the West. When this begins to
happen, there is a significant potential for the regime
to be weakened. Yet North Korea’s current economic
situation leaves its leadership few options. North Koreans seem to understand that they must work with
the United States and other nations in order to get assistance. However, the more its people are able to see
and have contact with Americans and others Westerners, the more they will start to see what they really
do not have and cannot achieve under the current
regime. When that happens, North Korea’s challenge
will be how to control the population’s expectations
and grievances so that they do not resort to violence.
The North Korean leadership has seen the examples of the Soviet Union and China and will surely
approach any engagement effort by the United States
with caution. In the end, however, we can only hope
to get to a peaceful unification by developing a sound
strategy and working with, rather than isolating North
Korea.
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APPENDIX I
THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND ITS
IMPORTANCE
The “Agreed Framework,” as it was known, was
signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994. The key elements of this document included the following:1
1. Both sides will cooperate to replace North Korea’s (DPRK) graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities with light-water reactors (LWR).
• The United States will organize an international consortium to build LWRs.
• The United States will supply 500,000 tons of
heavy fuel oil annually to replace the energy
of the closed graphite-moderated reactors
until the LWRs are completed.
• As soon as the agreement goes into effect,
the DPRK will freeze graphite moderated
reactors. They will be dismantled when the
LWRs are completed.
• The United States and the DPRK will cooperate to make sure that the spent fuel rods
from the DPRK’s graphite moderated reactors are properly stored during construction
of the LWRs, and will dispose of them when
the LWRs are completed without them being
reprocessed in the DPRK.
2. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
• Barriers to trade and investment will be removed.
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• E
 ach side will open a liaison office in the
other’s capital.
• As progress is made on other issues, the two
countries will upgrade relations to the ambassadorial level.
3. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
• The United States will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use
of nuclear weapons by the United States.
• The DPRK will consistently make steps to
implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
• The DPRK will engage in north-south dialogue.
4. Both sides will work together to strengthen the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
• The DPRK will continue to remain in the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT).
• Upon conclusion of the supply contract for
the provision of the LWR, ad hoc and routine
inspections will resume under the DPRK’s
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with respect to facilities
not subject to the freeze.
• When progress is sufficient in the LWR, the
DPRK will come into full compliance with its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
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APPENDIX II
COMPARISON OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES
BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA
Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification,
available
from
www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.
jsp?pgname=NORtables.

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, available from
www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=NORtables.
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An, Chung-yŏng, Nick Eberstadt, and Yŏng-sŏn Yi. A New International Engagement Framework for North Korea? Contending Perspectives, Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America,
2004.
Bae, Jin-Young, “The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunification
and Its Impact on South Korea’s Macroeconomic Stability,” Joint
U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 6, 1996, pp. 185-202.
Bechtol, Bruce E, Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North
Korea, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007.
Becker, Jasper, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat
of North Korea. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Bleiker, Roland, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Breen, Michael, The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want,
Where Their Future Lies, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
Carpenter, Ted Galen and Doug Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Chong, Bong-uk, North Korea, the Land That Never Changes:
Before and After Kim Il-Sung, Seoul, Republic of Korea: Naewoe
Press, 1995.
Cucullu, Gordon, Separated at Birth; How North Korea Became
the Evil Twin, Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2004.
Eberstadt, Nicholas, “The Persistence of North Korea: What
Has Been Keeping Pyongyang Afloat?” Policy Review, OctoberNovember 2004.
Flassbeck, Heiner and Gustav Horn, German Unification: An
Example for Korea? Brookfield, WI: Ashgate Publishing Company,
1996.

61

French, Paul, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula—a Modern
History, London, UK: Zed Books, 2005.
Galgano, Francis Anthony and Eugene Joseph Palka, North
Korea, Geographic Perspectives, Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004.
Garner, Shelly Renae, The “Two Plus Four” Talks and the Resolution of the External Aspects of German Unification, Thesis (M.A.),
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1992.
Goldstein, Frank L. and Frank E. Emmett, A Psychological Perspective on the People within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK), U.S. Strategic Command, April 18, 2004.
Gunde, Richard, North Korea a Greater Danger than Iraq, Los
Angeles, CA: University of California at Los Angeles International Institute, November 1, 2002, available from www.international.
ucla.edu/print.asp?parentid=2470.
Haggard, Stephan and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea:
Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York: Columbia University Press,
2007.
Hart-Landsberg, Martin, Korea: Division, Reunification, and
U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998.
Harrison, Selig S., Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification
and U.S. Disengagement, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2002.
Hassig, Kongdan O., Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Kenneth E.
Gause, Ralph C. Hassig, and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, North Korean Policy Elites, Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information
Center, 2004, available from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA427588.
Heilemann, Ullrich and Hermann Rappen, The Seven Year
Itch? German Unity from a Fiscal Viewpoint, Washington, DC:
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1997.

62

Howard, P., “Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Studies
Quarterly. Vol. 48, No. 4, 2004, pp. 805-828.
Hunter, Helen-Louise, Kim Il-Song’s North Korea, Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1999.
International Crisis Group (ICG), North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy, ICG Asia report, No. 61, Washington, DC: ICG,
2003.
____________, China and North Korea: Comrades Forever? ICG
Asia Report, No. 112, Seoul, South Korea: ICG, 2006.
____________, Japan and North Korea Bones of Contention, Seoul,
Korea: ICG, 2005, available from bibpurl.oclc.org/web/10952.
____________, North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand? Seoul, Korea: ICG, 2005, available from bibpurl.oclc.org/
web/9903.
Ji, Young-Sun, Conflicting Visions for Korean Re-unification, Fellows paper—Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2001.
Kaplan, Robert D., “When North Korea Falls,” The Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 298, No. 3, October 2006, available from www.theatlantic.com/doc/200610/kaplan-korea.
Kihl, Young W. and Hong Nack Kim, North Korea: The Politics
of Regime Survival, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006.
Kim, Samuel S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold
War World, Demystifying North Korea Series, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, available from
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB772.pdf.
Kim, Samuel S., ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold
War Era, New York: Palgrave, 2001.
____________, Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

63

Kim, Suk H., North Korea at a Crossroads, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 2003.
Korea (South), The Road to Korean Unification, Seoul, Korea:
Korean Ministry of Unification, 2008.
Lee, Hy-Sang, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.
Martin, Bradley K., Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader:
North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, New York: St Martin’s Press,
2004.
Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki and Emma Chanlett-Avery, The North
Korean Economy Leverage and Policy Analysis, CRS Report for Congress, RL32493, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2008, available from www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/RL32493.pdf.
Niksch, Larry A., North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development
and Diplomacy, CRS Report for Congress, RL33590, Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2008,
available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33590.pdf.
Noland, Marcus, The Economics of Korean Unification, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007.
Noland, Marcus, ed., Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Policy Special Report 10, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998.
Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and LiGang Liu, “The
Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification,” Asian Survey, Vol.
XXXVIII, No. 8, August 1998, pp. 801-814.
Oh, Kong Dan, Leadership Change in North Korean Politics: The
Succession to Kim Il Sung, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1988.
Oh, Kong Dan and Ralph Hassig, North Korea through the
Looking Glass, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press,
2000.

64

O’Hanlon, Michael O. and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea, New York:
McGraw Hill, 2003.
Olsen, Edward A., “North Korea’s Nuclear Acknowledgement: Motivation and Risks,” Strategic Insights, Monterey, CA:
Naval Post Graduate School, October 24, 2002, available from
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/nov02/eastAsia.pdf.
Orr, Robert C., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for
Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Significant Issues Series, Vol. 26, No.
7, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) Press, 2004.
Park, Kyung-Ae and Tal-chung Kim, Korean Security Dynamics in Transition, New York: Palgrave, 2001.
Pinkston, D. A. and P. C. Saunders, 2003, “Seeing North Korea Clearly,” Survival. Vol. 45, pp. 79-102.
Pollack, Jonathan D., “The United States, North Korea, and
the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review,
Summer 2003, pp. 14-16.
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, The Road to Korean
Reunification, Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Unification, 2009.
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification Website, available
from www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=POLworkplan.
Scobell, Andrew, Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and
the System, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 2006.
____________, Projecting Pyongyang, Demystifying North Korea, Vol. 7, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 2008, available from purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS92390.
Scobell, Andrew and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military
Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, Demystifying North Korea Series, Carl-

65

isle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.
Available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB
771.pdf.
____________, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, Demystifying
North Korea Series, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 2005, available from purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS63250.
Seliger, B., “Unified Germany’s Security Policy: Some Lessons for Korea,” Korean Journal of Defense Analsis, Vol. 15, No. 1,
2003, pp. 183-200.
Smith, Hazel, Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer,
Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2007.
____________, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea, Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005.
Snyder, Scott, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating
Behavior, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press,
1999.
Stares, Paul B. and Joel S. Wit, Preparing for Sudden Change in
North Korea, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, available from www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/North_Korea_CSR42.pdf.
Stark, Rodney, Sociology, 4th Ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Co, 1992.
Steinberg, Dana, “Newly Available Evidence Offers Insights
Into North Korea’s Thinking, Actions,” Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, available from
www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.
item&news_id=11681.
Suh, Dae-Sook and Chae-Jin Lee, North Korea After Kim Il
Sung, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

66

Triplett, William C., Rogue State: How a Nuclear North Korea
Threatens America, Washington, DC: Regnery Pub, 2004.
United States, Background Note, North Korea, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
February 2009, available from purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33761.
____________,The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America, Washington, DC: The White House, 2006, available
from purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS67777.
____________,The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America, Washington, DC: The White House, 2002.
____________, The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America, Washington, DC: The White House, 1999.
____________, CIA World Factbook 2009, New York: Skyhorse
Publishing Co., Inc, 2008.
Vaknin, Sam, “The Cost of Unification - German Lessons for
Korea,” Global Politician, 2005, available from www.globalpolitician.
com/2483-korea.
Weathersby, Kathryn, “The Enigma of the North Korean Regime: Back to the Future?” Ilmin International Relations Review,
Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 235-266.
Wolf, Charles and Norman D. Levin, Modernizing the North
Korean System: Objectives, Method, and Application, Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2008.
Wolf, Charles and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes:
Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Korean Unification, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.
Yamaji, Hideki, Policy Recommendations for Japan Unification of
the Korean Peninsula, CNAPS working paper series, 2004, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian
Policy Studies, 2004, available from www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/
papers/yamaji2004.pdf.

67

Yun, Philip W. and Gi-Wook Shin, North Korea: 2005 and Beyond, Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2006.
Zilian, Frederick, From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the National People’s (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr,
Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought, Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1999.

68

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Gregg F. Martin
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Author
Colonel (Retired) Bill Boik
Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

